報告時間：12月6日下午1：30

報告地點：旭日樓308教室

報告主題：金融約束的多維度與内幕交易行為（Multidimensionality of Financial Constraints and Insider Trading Activities）

報告人：Shantanu Dutta教授

主持人：唐松蓮 教授

報告人簡介

Shantanu Dutta是渥太華大學特爾弗管理學院的金融學教授和全球金融研究員。他因其在金融領域的創新研究而獲得特爾弗管理學院卓越研究獎。此前，他曾在安大略大學理工學院（UOIT）、新斯科舍省聖弗朗西斯澤維爾大學和曼谷聖母升天大學擔任全職教員。在進入學術界之前，他曾在建築材料領域全球領導者拉法基公司擔任财務經理和項目總監。Shantanu Dutta 的研究重點是并購、媒體報道和财務決策、公司治理、市場效率、股息政策和技術管理。他曾在Journal of Corporate Finance、Financial Management、Journal of Banking and Finance、Review of Accounting Studies、Journal of Financial Research、Journal of Business Finance & Accounting、Journal of Multinational Financial Management、Multinational Finance Journal、Quarterly Journal of Finance and Accounting、Global Finance Journal、Canadian Investment Review、Corporate Governance – An International Review （CGIR）、International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance等期刊發表論文。他還在許多學術會議上參與并發表論文，他是SSHRC資助和巴克萊全球投資者加拿大研究獎（2006年）的獲得者，最近，他還因在《國際管理金融雜志》上發表的文章而獲得了2009年和2014年文人網絡卓越獎（翡翠出版社）的“高度贊揚獎”。

報告簡介

This study expands upon the seminal work by Hoberg and Maksimovic (2015) on multidimensional financial constraints (FC) by investigating the relationship between FC and insider trading. We analyze a dataset of 51,733 insider purchasing transactions from 2,941 firms that occurred between 2003 and 2015. Unlike previous studies that rely on unidimensional financial constraint measures, we concentrate on two distinct dimensions of financial constraints, specifically the 'equity-focused' and 'debt-focused' constraints proposed by Hoberg and Maksimovic. These dimensions are associated with a firm's challenges in equity and debt issuance, respectively. Our findings reveal different patterns of insider trading between the two types of financially constrained firms. ‘Equity-focused’ constrained firms tend to have less profitable insider trades while ‘debt-focused’ constrained firms have more profitable insider trades. We also find that insiders in ‘equity-focused’ constrained firms purchase more of their own companies’ stocks despite the lower insider trading profitability. However, such purchase deals are associated with more equity financing and reduced financial constraints in the future. Conversely, insider purchase deals in ‘debt-focused’ constrained firms are not associated with future financing or reduction of future financial constraints. Our results suggest insider trading could be motivated by different types of financial constraints in a firm.