報告主題：專利延伸和收回監管對綠色藥房的影響（The Effects of Patent Extension and Take-Back Regulation on Green Pharmacy）

報告時間：6月12日（周一）9:30

報告地點：延安路校區旭日樓306教室

主持人：沈濱 教授

報告人：史天琴 副教授

報告簡介：

The eco-toxicity arising from unused pharmaceuticals has regulators advocating the benign design concept of “green pharmacy,” but high research and development expenses can be prohibitive. We therefore examine the impacts of two regulatory mechanisms, patent extension and take-back regulation, on inducing drug manufacturers to go green. One incentive suggested by the European Environmental Agency is a patent extension for a company that redesigns its already patented pharmaceutical to be more environmentally friendly. This incentive can encourage both the development of degradable drugs and the disclosure of technical information. Yet, it is unclear how effective the extension would be in inducing green pharmacy and in maximizing social welfare.  We develop a game-theoretic model in which an innovative company collects monopoly profits for a patented pharmaceutical but faces competition from a generic rival after the patent expires. A social-welfare-maximizing regulator is the Stackelberg leader. The regulator leads by offering a patent extension to the innovative company while also imposing take-back regulation on the pharmaceutical industry. Then the two-profit maximizing companies respond by setting drug prices and choosing whether to invest in green pharmacy. The regulator’s optimal patent extension offer can induce green pharmacy but only if the offer exceeds athreshold length that depends on the degree of product differentiation present in the pharmaceutical industry. The regulator’s correspondingly optimal take-back regulation generally prescribes a required collection rate that decreases as its optimal patent extension offer increases, and vice versa. By isolating green pharmacy as a potential target to address pharmaceutical eco-toxicity at its source, the regulatory policy that we consider, which combines the incentive inherent in earning a patent extension on the one hand with the penalty inherent in complying with take-back regulation on the other hand, serves as a useful starting point for policymakers to optimally balance economic welfare considerations with environmental stewardship considerations.

報告人簡介：

史天琴博士是美國聖何塞州立大學副教授。她在伊利諾伊大學香槟分校獲得運營管理博士學位，上海交通大學管理科學與工程碩士學位及數學學士學位。史博士的研究興趣包括可持續運營管理和智能供應鍊管理。她的出版物發表在《制造與服務運營管理》、《生産和運營管理》、《決策科學》、《運籌學年鑒》、《運輸研究E部分》和《國際生産研究雜志》等期刊上。