報告題目：Subsidy Wars for Market Share: When and How Much to Subsidize?

報告時間：周四（9月24日）上午10:00

報告地點：延安路校區旭日樓211教室

報告人：林軍 教授

報告簡介：

Nowadays, subsidy wars among firms for market share frequently happen in markets with network effects. Although such wars are common and costly, research on the subsidy strategies of firms is lacking. We discuss subsidy competition in a duopoly market where the entrant enters the market by subsidizing consumers and the incumbent subsidizes consumers subsequently to maintain its market dominance and maximize its competitive advantage in unit or total subsidy. We show that when the competitive advantage in unit subsidy cost is considered, the incumbent will subsidize consumers after the entrant occupies a certain market share, which is often less than one-fourth. If the competitive advantage in total subsidy cost is considered, then the optimal market share point at which the incumbent starts to subsidize consumers increases with the total subsidy of the entrant. The incumbent cannot keep its market share advantage with less total subsidy when the total subsidy of the entrant exceeds a threshold. The above results hold in general when the firms’ products are differentiated vertically or the horizontal difference between products is small compared to network effects.

報告人簡介：

林軍，教授，博士生導師，西安交通大學管理科學系主任，智能決策與優化研究所所長，連續5年（2014-2018）入選愛思唯爾（Elsevier）中國高被引學者，入選西安交通大學首批青年拔尖人才支持計劃，陝西高校青年創新團隊帶頭人。主要從事“互聯網+”商業模式與戰略、大數據分析與管理決策、複雜工程與研發項目管理、新産品與互聯網平台管理等領域的理論和實踐研究。先後發表專著2本、學術期刊論文70餘篇，其中SCI、SSCI檢索期刊論文35篇。擔任工程與技術管理領域頂級期刊《IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management》和國際學術期刊《Journal of Management and Strategy》等編委，擔任中國管理現代化研究會青年工作委員會副秘書長，中國系統工程學會可持續運營與管理系統分會常務理事，中國系統工程學會青年工作委員會委員。已主持國家自然科學基金項目4項（已結題1項且後評估為優秀），負責國家社科重大子課題一項，參與或主持其他國家級、省部級項目10餘項，以第一完成人獲陝西省科學技術進步獎二等獎一項、陝西省哲學社會科學優秀成果獎三等獎一項、陝西高等學校人文社會科學研究優秀成果獎一等獎一項、陝西高等學校科學技術獎一等獎一項。